To begin this paper by claiming that the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan upon sea power in general, and British sea power in particular, have been of the utmost significance to students of naval history, would be to come close to offering a truism. The reception accorded to such books of his as The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783, both at the time of publication and in the decades following, reflected the importance which his message was seen to have for all modern states which bordered the seas. In his own land of the United States, prominent statesmen such as Theodore Roosevelt were to accept his advice and doctrines wholeheartedly; in Britain he was feted and revered, the more especially since he had openly expressed his admiration for the Royal Navy and had brought intellectual support to the "Blue Water" school of strategists; in Germany Kaiser Wilhelm II ordered a copy of Mahan's book to be placed on board every warship, while Admiral Tirpitz's strategy was mudi influenced by it; and from Japan to Latin America this sdiolarly captain's ideas became accepted as a gospel by maritime men. So widespread did Mahan's general views become that it is possible to present only a brief synopsis here. He claimed that "the key to mudi of history as well as of the policy of nations bordering upon the sea" would be found by a study of the naval conflicts of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and he proceeded to illustrate by historical examples how certain immutable conditions (the geographical position and physical conformation of a country; the extent of national territory to be defended or extended; the size and character of its population; and the nature and wisdom of its government) were the real reasons for the steady rise to world power of the British Empire at that time and for the relative decline of those states such as Spain, the Netherlands and France which had opposed this. As sudi, his writings were regarded as a tool with whidi to unlock an understanding of developments in international power politics over the preceding centuries. More important still -and this was the true ground for Mahan's immense influence at the official level in the two decades before 1914 -he also appeared to offer important lessons and predictions to all those states which wished to maintain or to extend their influence in the world in the future. It was not strictly as an historian, but as a prophet, that Mahan was respected at this time 2 .
This being the case, it is worth while to examine some of the political and military implications for the future which emerged from his works, or were in some cases read into them by his enthusiastic but one-sided followers: that large battlefleets, and a concentration of force, decided control of the oceans, whereas a guerre de course strategy was always ineffectual; that the blockade was a very effective weapon which would sooner or later bring an enemy to its knees; that the possession of select bases on islands or continental peripheries was more valuable than control of large land masses; that oversea colonies were vital for a nation's prosperity, and that colonial trade was the most treasured commerce of all; that "travel and traffic by water have always been easier and cheaper than by land": that an island nation, resting secure upon its naval might, could with impunity ignore the struggles of land powers and adopt if necessary an isolationist policy; and that the rise of a country to world greatness without sea power was almost unthinkable. Taken altogether, they formed the basic tenets of the pre-1914 navalist philosophy, mudi of whidi endured well past that particular epoch; it centred upon the belief that sea power had been more influential than land power in the past and always would be so. Finally, Mahan, whilst urging the need for a strong American fleet, fully expected and firmly hoped that Britain's naval predominance would remain unassailed in the future. He certainly neither contemplated nor wished for a decline of that British Empire whose foremost naval scholar he had become.
It may be doubted in retrospect whether the importance which Mahan and his disciples attributed to the influence of sea power upon the political struggles of the European great powers between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries was fully justified in fact. Admiral Fisher, usually a convinced Mahanite, was at one time honest enough to admit that the battle of Trafalgar, glorious though it was, had done nothing to check Napoleon's continental aggrandisement: Austerlitz, a few months later, was of greater significance there 3 . However, to attempt a modification of Mahan's interpretation of the past is beyond the scope of this paper, and even the most sceptical would admit that his work was very illuminating and that no scholar since his day could write about the rise of the British Empire without acknowledgement to the role of sea power. What certainly deserves greater questioning -and it is the intention of the present essay to do this -was the presumption in Mahan's writings that what had happened in the past was going to occur in the future as well. In point of fact, his mind was too rooted in previous events to be much of a success in the field of prophecy. As his biographer had admitted, In activity and by disposition Mahan largely looked to the past; he gained his lessons from a study of the past and used the past for analogies. There can be no doubt that Mahan was so absorbed with the past that he often failed to appreciate future trends in naval warfare. He was not sufficiently alive to the fact that history frequently does not repeat itself and that the shape of things to come may not always follow the pattern of the past 4 . Nor should this conclusion be at all surprising to fellow sdiolars in this discipline. However skilled historians may be in tracing themes in the past, they have rarely adiieved much success in predicting the future. The variables of history -the accident, the role of individuals, the changes caused by technological break- throughs and unforeseen events -and the sheer complexity of world society usually only permit us to identify the significant historial trends of a period in retrospect.
*
Ironically enough, it was whilst Mahan's popularity as a pundit was at its height in Europe and the United States that a much more perceptive -though less well known -prophecy of future world politics was being elaborated. On January 25th, 1904, the geopolitician Haiford Mackinder read a paper to the Royal Geographical Society entitled The Geographical Pivot of History 5 . In it he suggested that there had been what he called a Columbian epoch -about four centuries of overseas exploration and conquest by the European powerswhich was now coming to an end and that another, far different, age was about to begin. With very little of the world left to conquer, "every explosion of social forces" would take place in a mudi more enclosed environment and would no longer be dissipated into unknown regions; efficiency and internal development would replace expansionism as the main aim of modern states; and for the first time in history there would be "a correlation between the larger geographical and the larger historical generalizations", that is, size and numbers would be more accurately reflected in the sphere of international developments. This being the case, Mackinder continued, it was important to consider what the future would bring to the great strategical "pivot area" of the world -central Russia. That vast region, once the source of the many invading armies which had for centuries poured into Europe and the Middle East, had been outflanked, neutralised and mudi reduced in importance by the mariners of the Columbian era, who had opened most of the rest of the world to western influence. For 400 years the world's trade had developed on the sea, its population had on the whole lived near to the sea, political and military changes had been primarily influenced by sea power. Now, with industrialisation, with railways, with investment, with new agricultural and mining techniques, central Asia was posed to regain its previous importance:
The spaces within the Russian Empire and Mongolia are so vast, and their potentialities in population, wheat, cotton, fuel and metals so incalculably great, that it is inevitable that a vast economic world, more or less apart, will there develop inaccessible to oceanic commerce e .
Mackinder's stress upon the importance of the "Heartland", later taken up by Haushofer and other Nazi geopoliticians and somewhat discredited as a consequence, is probably too simple, one-sided and deterministic to be accepted in its entirety today; but the broad outlines of his argument were prescient and compel the closest attention. Certainly, his audience at the Royal Geographical Society was impressed by this unusually wideranging paper. One of them, Leo Amery, ventured to go further and, while not laying stress so specifically upon central Asia, elaborated one aspect of Mackinder's message in even clearer powerpolitical terms: sea-power alone, if it is not based on great industry, and has a great industry behind it, is too weak for offence to really maintain itself in the world struggle... both the sea and the railway are going in the future... to be supplemented by the air as a means of locomotion, and when we come to that... the successful powers will be those who have the greatest industrial base. It will not matter whether they are in the centre of a continent or on an island; those people who have the industrial power and the power of invention and science will be able to defeat all others T . These predictions, of the rise of certain super-powers with massive populations and industrial strength, was not new to political thinking -as early as 1825 de Tocqueville had forecast the inevitable rise of the USA and Russia -but they were now being expressed in a much more definite form. Some 20 years before Madrinder, moreover, Sir John Seeley had pointed to the immense developments which "steam and electricity" were bringing to those great continental states, against whose consolidated resources and manpower the widely-scattered British Empire would find it impossible to compete unless drastic changes occurred in its own structure. "Russia and the United States will surpass in power the states now called great as much as the great country-states of the sixteenth century surpassed Florence 8 ." Yet if Seeley still placed hopes upon the transformation of the Empire into a much more centralised organic unit, Madrinder could not be so sanguine. Britain would continue to maintain its strategical and maritime advantages vis-ä-vis Europe, but these would count for little against the rising super-powers. Already in his book Britain and the British Seas, published in 1902, Madrinder had insisted:
In the presence of vast Powers, broad-based upon the resources of half continents, Britain could not again become mistress of the seas. Much depends on the maintenance of a lead won under earlier conditions. Should the sources of wealth and vigour upon which the navy was founded run dry, the imperial security of Britain will be lost. From the early history of Britain herself it is evident that mere insularity gives no indefeasible right to marine sovereignty If it were possible to express Madrinder's novel and rather isolated views with the utmost simplicity, one might say that a decline in Britain's relative world position was being at least hinted at, if not forecast, because of two closely-linked developments: 1. Britain's naval power, rooted in her economic strength, would no longer remain supreme when other nations with greater resources and manpower overhauled her previous industrial lead, and 2. Sea power itself was waning in relation to land power. The first of these developments was undoubtedly true and in it, clearly, lay the chief cause of Britain's long-term decline 10 . In a certain sense, this had always been quite probable, for Britain's economic domination of the world after 1815 had rested upon a unique concatenation of very favourable circumstances. It was not to be expected that she would remain eternally either the only or even the greatest industrialised nation: when others took the same path, a relative decline was inevitable. It was more perturbing, though, to learn that weaknesses in the British system were accelerating this long-term trend: scattered and small-scale industrial plant; a reluctance to invest in new techniques or in the industries (chemicals, electricity, etc.) of the future; inadequate technical education in the nation at large; the lack of competitiveness and poor salesmanship in foreign markets; the unwillingness of the ruling Elites, through social inclination and a devotion to laissez-faire, to take much of an interest in matters of trade and industry. Many people proclaimed their alarm when German and American steel production overtook Britain's, or when their country's share of the world's manufacturing capacity dropped steadily from 31,8% in 1870 to 14,7 °/o in 1906-1910 , but no-one could produce a solution to the problem. Comfort was taken from the fact that British trade could still be directed into her vast "formal" and "informal" empire after losing out in more competitive markets, and that her role as the world's leading financier, insurer, commodity dealer and shipper actually increased in response to the international demand for these services; but this did not ease the fears of those who perceived that Britain's unique commercial and industrial lead, upon which Pitt, Canning and Palmerston had been able to find the ultimate support for their foreign and naval policies, was gone. In view of all this, would it be possible for her to stay the pace in the power-political struggles of the twentieth century also?
It would be some time before the answer to that question was clear; but even at the turn of the century it was obvious that the spread of industrialisation was altering the world's international balance in many ways. Nations long dormant though potentially powerful because of their populations and resources had been galvanised by the Unbound Prometheus -the impact of technology and organisation -and these revolutions were already having strategical consequences. In the western hemisphere the United States was assuming a more and more dominating position, its economic activities and political influence permeating the Caribbean and Latin America. In the same way, Japan was pulling ahead of its neighbours in the Far East and extending its control there. The newly-united German Empire, boosted by an amazingly swift industrial and commercial expansion, was steadily changing the old balance of power in Europe. Finally, industrialisation was not only allowing Russia to take the first real steps to develop its immense resources but strategic railways were giving it a means of direct military pressure upon China and India. All of these changes implied at least a consequent diminution of Britain's influence in the areas concerned, and some a distinct restriction upon her hitherto almost unchallenged predominance and freedom of action. The same was true for the other great political development of the later nineteenth century -the colonial expansion of the great powers. Before this, the British had usually had to contend with the spasmodic diallenges of the French but now many others entered the fray, with the result that Britain's "informal empire" had either to be annexed or it was lost to new rivals. No doubt the British secured a larger share of the colonial spoils than anyone else -with their head-start, this was scarcely surprising -but again their position had relatively declined. Strategical supremacy was also affected by the acquisition by foreign powers of important bases along the world's shipping routes, for instance Bizerta, Dakar, Diego Suarez, Port Arthur, Manila and Hawaii.
These dianges bewildered many Britons, even though their feelings were often concealed by a display of national pride and bravado which mid-Victorians would have considered as both unnecessary and distasteful, Palmerston always excepted. The British public of the 1880s and 1890s would have been more upset still had the second aspect of Mackinder's thesis been better known to them: that sea power was itself waning in relation to land power. This, too, was a very long-term trend, in which the changes were to be measurable only over decades and in which the consequences were to be perceived only in the next century; but once again it is worth while to examine briefly its general characteristics in Mackinder's time. Perhaps the real villain of the piece was the railway, ironically a British invention and one which had greatly benefited the British economy and people. Nevertheless, the transformation it wrought upon such areas as central Europe, the "Heartland" of Russia and the mid-west of the United States was far more decisive; the industrialisation of these three regions, despite the assertions of certain economists in recent years, was scarcely feasible without the railway. The transport of goods, which had for centuries been cheaper and faster by water, now became easier by land, a tendency which was to increase with the introduction of motorised transport in the twentieth century. And not only was industry stimulated but commerce which had long been difficult now flourished under the new conditions: the opening of the Mont Cenis (1871) and St. Gotthard (1882) tunnels greatly increased the northward flow of Mediterranean fruits and vegetables, for example. The Columbian epoch of which Mackinder spoke, when most trade and populations had remained close to the sea, was slowly ending as continental countries were freed from this physical restriction. With the improvement of land communications, a nation without much seaboard but with a large population and extensive territories could now exploit its resources, and the peculiar advantages of small, predominantly naval/commercial countries such as Holland and Britain were being gradually lost. People, too, could be transported across land mudi faster, a fact which not only affected shipping companies adversely but also had direct military implications.
The body which appears to have appreciated this first was the Prussian General Staff, whose efficient planners turned railway timetabling into a work of art. In 1866 it had been able to put 400 000 into the field in a very short time for the campaign against Austria; and "it mastered the problems of mass organisation and movement so brilliantly that in 1870 1 183 000 men passed through the barracks into the army in eighteen days, and 462 000 were transported to the French frontier in the same time u ." The traditional British strategy against one power or a coalition dominating Europe, of despatching expeditions to the peripheries, be it in the Baltic or to the Portuguese or Italian coast, would now be a mudi more risky proposition if the enemy could swiftly rush a far greater force to the threatened point by rail instead of having to rely upon forced mardies along poor roads. Conversely, a land power could be freed from its dependence upon the Royal Navy in certain circumstances -the most notable example of this being the advantages which Russia accrued to itself by the construction of the trans-Siberian railway. The latter, so argued the Russian finance minister Witte in 1892, "would not only bring about the opening of Siberia, but would revolutionise world trade, supercede the Suez Canal as the leading route to China, enable Russia to flood the Chinese market with textiles and metal goods, and secure political control of northern China 12 ." u These hopes were soon to be blunted by the war with Japan, the results of whidi reassured navalists everywhere; but in retrospect it is possible to see the Russian defeat being due more to unreadiness and inefficiency than to the workings of sea power. Even as it was, the Russian expansion by land was quite impressive, Mackinder later noting in one of his perceptive comparisons: It was an unprecendented thing in the year 1900 that Britain should maintain a quarter of a million men in her war with the Boers at a distance of six thousand miles over the ocean; but it was as remarkable a feat for Russia to place an army of more than a quarter of a million men against the Japanese in Manchuria in 1904 at a distance of four thousand miles by rail 13 .
More worrying still to the British was the threat which Russian railway building offered to their control of India. For centuries this important possession had been only accessible by sea, but by 1900 the approadiing Orenburg-Tashkent railway created a danger to which the British simply had no answer: the Royal Navy could not defend the North-West Frontier. Truly, the defence of an empire susceptible in so many places to attack from land was a desperate problem for a country that was basically a sea power, as The Naval and Military Record pointed out in 1901 in a leader whidi is worth quoting at some length: There has never been room for doubt that certain limitations must hamper the expansion of a naval Power. The familiar truth has been somewhat obscured by the writings of Captain Mahan, whidi may easily be misread by Englishmen who are naturally proud of their Navy and of their expanding Empire. It may be doubted, however, if Captain Mahan ever intended to suggest that an extensive Empire, scattered over all parts of the globe, can be held for centuries by sea power alone. The defence of India, as we recently pointed out, is based upon sea power, but it also involves the maintenance of 300 000 troops, and makes a considerable drain upon the limited supply of military recruits under our voluntary system of service. The Canadian frontier, again, could hardly be held with security in the event of war against the United States. Our conquests in South Africa may oblige us to maintain a permanent garrison of 50 000 troops, and at present it is not very clear how that army is to be raised under the voluntary system ... Singapore, for example, is a valuable naval base, but it cannot be held by the Navy alone. The port requires a large garrison. Thus, the limitations of sea power begin to be felt when territorial expansion can no longer be safeguarded exclusively by the guns of the fleet, backed by minor garrisons w . There were other dianges, too, whidi had taken place or were still in progress in the nineteenth century, whidi might cause one to wonder if Mahan's strategical analysis of Britain's previous naval wars would be of mudi relevance in the future. Particularly significant here was the alteration in the effectiveness of the blockade, previously a slow but terrible weapon. The newer world powers, the United States and Germany and the old enemy of Russia, having less of their national wealth bound up in overseas trade, were far less susceptible to defeat by naval pressure alone than ever Spain, Holland or even France had been. To seize the Spanish bullion convoy or to interrupt the Dutch trade with the Indies had been to deal the enemy's economy a very severe blow indeed; but now it was different, as was emphasised in an interesting lecture given at the United Services Institute by one Douglas Owen in 1905. As he explained, the trade whidi British privateers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had harrassed was that between ports whidi then belonged to her rivals -Ceylon, Mauritius, Capetown, Guinea, Dominica, Trinidad, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, Demarara, Grenada, French Canada: since those times they had all become British. In the second place, colonial trade as a whole had declined in importance: the gold and silver from Latin America, the spices from the East Indies, the rum and tobacco and sugar from the West Indies, had no modern equivalents -except perhaps the carriage of raw materials and foodstuffs to the British Isles itself. The best targets, in other words, were now nearly all British. Thirdly, the coming of the railway had reduced the effectiveness of the blockade and the possibility of paralysing the enemy's trade: Since those times, railways have been introduced and so developed as to link together city, town, and port, whilst inland water-ways have on the Continent been created and developed to an extent of whidi most Englishmen have no conception. Even if it were possible for us to close absolutely our adversary's ports, his trade would go on with little interruption ... Today France can supply herself through Belgium; Germany, through Holland and Belgium; Holland, through Belgium and Germany; Russia, through Germany and the Low Countries ... The days of coastal blockade, in the case of European States, with any thought of starving out the enemy, or with any idea of making prizes of his coastal traffic, have gone for ever 15 .
This latter section was of course written under the belief that the clauses of the Declaration of Paris of 1856 concerning the "freedom of the seas" would be observed in future wars; and that the enemy would simply proceed to lay up all his ships and to rely upon neutral carriers. But even if this was not to be the case, Owen's analysis still possessed a certain validity: continental states could obtain supplies much easier from neutral neighbours under modern conditions of transport than they ever could have in the past. And it was laughable to think of trying to starve out Russia or the United States. What was more, the new inventions of the mine, the torpedo, the submarine and the long-range coastal ordnance were making the operational application of the blockade very difficult -so much so that the Royal Navy gradually abandoned the idea of a close blockade of the German coast in the years before 1914 1β . Furthermore, although at first the new weapons seemed only to restrict the freedom of action of battleships operating off the enemy's ports, it was later recognised that there was no inherent reason why the mine and the torpedo could not be employed on the high seas also. Some far-sighted strategists quiddy drew their own conclusions: Admiral Sir Percy Scott caused a minor furore by a letter to the Times of June 1914, in which he prophesised that submarines and aircraft would make the battleship worthless and pleaded instead for a strategy based upon a large air force, a fleet of submarines and many cruisers (for trade protection) 17 . His critics protested that his case was not proven and that Mahan's principles would continue to be valid. To see the victory of guerre de course .theories at this time of the great power of the British battlefleet would have been too bitter a pill to swallow; but behind their protests one can also detect the deeper fear that the supremacy of the submarine, torpedo-boat and aeroplane on the naval battlefield would presage the fall of Britain's maritime supremacy. A battlefleet, after all, could only be built by a limited number of powers and took many years to create, giving the British time to take countermeasures; any reasonably ambitious country could afford aircraft and submarines, however, thus assuring to itself at least local naval dominance. Industrialisation had two further consequences which affected Britain's strategic capabilities. In the first place, the developments in shipping, taken together with her industrial growth and increased population and prosperity, led to an enormous increase in her dependence upon the import of foodstuffs and raw materials -and this meant that she was much more vulnerable to hostile naval pressures upon her own lines of communication with the outside world. The Royal Navy would now have thousands of merchant ships to protect in wartime, and the consequences of any interruption would be far more serious. In the second place, the industrial revolution, with its accompanying rise in population and mobility, not only permitted still larger armies to be recruited and transported than was hitherto the case, but it also provided the financial and material strength for them to be clothed, armed and fed for a very long time. In other words, as Ivan S. Bloch intuitively suggested in his book Modern Weapons and Modern War, future conflicts between Great Powers were going to be endurance tests, where the defensive would have the upper hand:
instead of a war fought out to the bitter end in a series of decisive battles, we shall have as a substitute a long period of continually increasing strain upon the resources of the combatants. The war, instead of being a hand-to-hand contest in which the combatants measure their physical and moral superiority, will become a kind of stalemate, in which neither army being able to get at the other, both armies will be maintained in opposition to eadi other, threatening each other, but never able to deliver a final and decisive attack 1B . All this turned the small professional army whidi Britain possessed into a nonentity and reduced even further its ability to influence continental events through military pressure. If the British were to land their army on the German coast, Bismarck is reported to have quipped, he would call out the local police force and have it arrested! From about 1900 onwards, the British government began to respond to certain of these challenges and to reduce some of its world-wide defence commitments: the western hemisphere was left to the United States; Japan assumed the task of protecting British interests in the Far East; even the Mediterranean, the "windpipe' of the Empire, became a Frendi naval responsibility after 1912; and Fisher's drastic reorganisation of the Royal Navy saw the scattered gunboat fleets withdrawn and scrapped, and overseas stations amalgamated. The end of the age of Pax Britannica had arrived, hastened -and in some way concealedby the parallel need to concentrate more and more of the fleet in the North Sea to meet the growing German challenge. Yet this reduction in Britain's world role, serious though it was, did not compare with a far greater revolution in her defence policy after 1905 -the virtual abandonment of "the British way of warfare". Reversing previous strategy, the British government made the Royal Navy "a subsidiary weapon, and grasped the glittering sword of Continental manufacture" By assuming an ever greater commitment to engage in a full-scale military campaign in Europe 19 . It was not the case, of course, that Whitehall deliberately planned sudi an astonishing change in its traditional policy -in fact, most statesmen and their advisors loathed the prospect of being embroiled in a continental conflict -but the circumstances gradually whittled down Britain's freedom of action until it appeared almost inevitable that an expeditionary force should be despatched across the Channel. The root of the problem, which the British had not needed to face for over a century, was that they could not make their homeland secure by naval measures alone: the balance of power in Europe was also important. Yet that balance, in equilibrium since the fall of Napoleon, was collapsing again as a united and powerful Germany assumed the preponderance to which her enormous industrial and population entitled her 20 ; and this was accentuated by the sudden collapse of Russian military might in 1905. What would happen if Germany overran the whole of western Europe or (a likely possibility if Britain ignored the European situation) turned France and the Low Countries into political appendages? The answers were (hilling to any Briton who pondered upon them: firstly, such an agglomeration of industrial strength would probably enable Germany to outbuild the British, whatever the efforts of the latter; and secondly, instead of being restricted to the North Sea, the High Seas Fleet could be based upon the harbours of Brest and Cherbourg while German torpedoboats closed the Channel. Slowly, reluctantly, men began to realise that Britain's naval position and the balance of power in Europe were inextricably linked, though Radicals and extreme Imperialists continued to deny this. Grey made the connection clear in his important statement of 1912 to the Committee of Imperial Defence:
if a European conflict, not of our making, arose, in which it was quite clear that the struggle was one for supremacy in Europe, in fact, that you got back to a situation something like that in the Napoleonic days, then ... our concern is seeing that there did not arise a supremacy in Europe which entailed a combination that would deprive us of the command of the sea would be such that we might have to take part in that European war. That is why the naval position underlines our European policy ...
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But how was Britain to "take part in that European war" unless she reorganised her army, which had been regarded hitherto as an imperial police force? The logic of the situation pointed to a total reorientation of British defence policy, from one based chiefly upon naval and imperial considerations to one which reflected the dominance of military and European factors. The change was of course fiercely resisted by the Admiralty; but it could not prevent the growing intimacy between British and French General Staffs, nor its own loss of influence. Indeed, at the famous meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence on 23rd August, 1911, the army convincingly won this interservice dispute. As Hankey, the secretary to that body, noted afterwards, From that time onwards there was never any doubt what would be the Grand Strategy in the event of our being drawn into a continental war in support of France. Unquestionably the Expeditionary Force, or the greater part of it, would have been sent to France as it actually was in 1914 22 . It may well be that the main consequence of the Anglo-French military conversations lay not so much in the political arena, where the British government still retained its freedom of action in 1914 even though the minds of the Cabinet had 20 A. J. P. been conditioned by their concern for the independence of western Europe in the preceding decade; but in the strategic field, where the "contours" of its intervention had already been decided. As Professor Williamson notes, "In August 1914 the British government, no less than its French and German counterparts, was committed to a 'plan' 23 ." Once this step had been taken, of course, it was almost impossible to reverse it. As the critics had always warned, a continental commitment was quick to take roots and even quicker to escalate: the recruitment and despatch of 25 or more divisions made more sense, in terms of strict military logic, than that of only 5 or 6 divisions, if the Low Countries were to be held and the German Army defeated. But this, naturally enough, also implied national conscription. It is hardly surprising to learn that the naval lobby tried throughout the war to regain its primacy in defence strategy and to steer the nation back to "the British way of warfare". This time, however, the politics whidi had been implemented in the wars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries proved to be less successful and effective against Germany. There is little doubt that the traditional methods would have been enthusiastically supported by the vast majority of the public and politicians in Britain, had they offered any prospect of success and a viable alternative to the slaughter on the western front; but, one by one, the cheap, maritime-based, peripheral ways of defeating an enemy were discovered to be inadequate when dealing with a continental bloc as strong and as self-sufficient as the Central Powers. The greatest disappointment came in the sphere of fleet operations itself, where the Admiralty had expected to meet and overwhelm the High Seas Fleet in a second and even greater Trafalgar, that Armageddon in the North Sea for which Fisher and his successors had been training the service for a whole decade. Yet this hope never came to anything -for quite understandable reasons. The first of these was Britain's favourable geographical position vis k vis Germany, which enabled her to close the enemy's lines of communication to the outside world by a distant blockade alone, instead of having to incur the risks from mines, submarines and torpedo-boats which a close blockade entailed. The second was the decisive British superiority in battleship numbers, which made a full toe-to-toe battle between the two fleets an extremely hazardous action for the Germans, who wisely sought to avoid sudi an event. The obvious conclusion to be drawn from this stalemate, as Professor Marder has put it, was "that Britain's principal strategical aims at sea, offensive and defensive, could be met by keeping the two holes to the north and south blockaded 24 ." An avoidance of battle in the North Sea meant that Britain could not lose the surface naval war, whereas Germany could not win it. This underlying strategical reason, together with the fact that each side grew increasingly nervous of attack from enemy submarines, goes a long way to explaining why there was no decisive fleet encounter in the First World War; chance clashes, sudi as those at the Dogger Bank and Jutland, simply confirmed the basic pattern. Hence the "feeling of incompleteness' confessed to by Admiral Wemyss in 1918 when the High Seas Fleet surrendered: the opportunity to fight a great sea battle, like that at the Nile or Trafalgar, had not appeared. Compared with the burdens borne by the army, the navy had appeared in the public eye to have done little to win the war against Germany, and, by its poor performance in defending Allied merchant shipping, had almost lost the war. The failure to stage a fleet confrontation was only the first of the unpleasant surprises to British navalists in this war. More were to come in those fields of colonial campaigns, commerce warfare, and peripheral operations which had also formed part of Mahan's historical panoply. Germany's overseas colonies were -with the exception of East Africa -quickly overrun by the Allies, but this hardly compared in importance with the Anglo-French struggles in earlier wars for India, the West Indies and Canada. The German colonial empire, although one million square miles in extent by 1914, housed only 21 000 Germans, took only 3,8 °/o of Germany's foreign investment and contributed to only 0,5 % of Germany's foreign trade. Losing such possessions was hardly a mortal blow to Berlin, therefore, especially when it is recalled that they provided few raw materials for German industry and that they had had to be heavily subsidised by the Reich, possibly to the tune of £ 100 million by 1914 26 . In strategic terms, they were considered irrelevant by the German government: Tirpitz had always argued that the challenge to Britain's world position had to be mounted in the North Sea and that, if they were successful there, they would be able to recoup all the territorial losses he anticipated in the extraEuropean fields. Samoa, South-West Africa and the rest were simply the first few unimportant pawns in a great and complex world struggle. Equally insignificant, in terms of the total war effort, was the effect of the British destruction of the few German surface commerce-raiders. Here, too, geography had compelled Tirpitz deliberately to eschew any large-scale naval commitment overseas, and the vessels which were on foreign stations were to "show the flag" -and were openly regarded in Berlin as hostages to fortune in the event of war. Of the 10 German surface commerce-raiders operating in the early months of the war, only a few, notably the Emden and the Karlsruhe, achieved worthwhile successes; but even they were silenced, and the total of British vessels sunk by such raiders throughout the war (442 000 tons) was not a significant blow. The only tangible threat emerged in the form of Spee's East Asian Squadron; but after its victory at Coronel it was quickly wiped out by Sturdee's battle cruisers at the Falklands. These battles, it has been pointed out, were the last ones of the war between surface ships by gunfire alone: "Thereafter, torpedoes, mines, submarines, and, to some extent, aircraft introduced complications unknown to Sturdee and Spee 2e ." The greatest change, of course, was the development of the U-boat as the commerce-raider par excellence -which was a predictable step once the German navy found it had no other obvious means of hitting its enemy, once the political opposition inside Germany had been overcome, and the necessary numbers of U-boats had been made ready. As soon as this campaign began in earnest, however, the British Admiralty's pre-war preparations for the defence of seaborne trade were shown to be quite out-ofdate. The other great weapon in the Royal Navy's armoury was the blockade. This, too, was now encrusted with tradition. Whilst Napoleon's armies had ranged all over Europe, so Mahan had taught, "there went on unceasingly that noiseless pressure upon the vitals of France, that compulsion whose silence, when once noted, becomes to the observer the most striking and awful mark of Sea Power." Before the war the Admiralty firmly believed that this strategy would be deadly in its effects: did they not control the enemy's sea routes to the outside world, and did not Germany, like all modern industrialised nations, depend so heavily upon this traffic that its interruption would have the most disastrous consequences for its entire war industry? All this was true, but it was offset by many other factors and it was a mistake to equate her position with that of an island state such as Britain or Japan. Approximately 19 °/o of her national income derived from exports, but of these only 20 °/o were extra-European; and only 10 °/o of Germany's national wealth was in overseas investment (cf. 27 °/o of Britain's), the returns from which contributed to only 2 % of her national income 27 . Theoretically, then, the loss of about 6 °/o, or perhaps 8 %, of her national income was not a disaster. This would be swiftly altered if certain essential raw materials could not be obtained, but the Central Powers already possessed or soon took over vast resources (e.g. Rumanian wheat and oil), and could also secure supplies via neutral neighbours. They had the technology, in addition, to create many ersatz goods. In the long term, naturally enough, the consequences of the Allied blockade were very serious but it was not until late in the war that German soldiers were affected by it. And it is worth suggesting that the civilian sufferings from the blockade would have been far fewer had not the great military campaigns swallowed up such astronomical amounts of foodstuffs, industrial products and especially the men who were needed to farm the land. Moreover, as Sir Herbert Richmond has wisely observed, the nineteenth-century improvements in land communications had greatly assisted the Central Powers and limited the implementation of an effective blockade by Britain alone; as a result, It was only owing to the fact that the land frontiers of the enemies were sealed by the armies, and that every nation of importance was either actively assisting with her navies at sea, or passively by withholding trade, that the eventual degree of isolation was procured whidi contributed to the victory i8 . Richmond's statement, in fact, leads straight to the weak point of the navalists' arguments -that this weapon, unless it be used against an island state heavily dependent upon overseas trade, is bound to be only a subsidiary one. Only when used in conjunction with a land blockade, and as an additional means of pressure to the constant assaults of armies, was its long-term and formidable influence upon an enemy such as Germany to be felt. For not only did the bloody wars of attrition of the western and eastern fronts sap the manpower, economy and morale of the Central Powers at a far higher rate than the maritime blockade ever did, but the latter could easily be neutralised by a German military victory in either theatre: The collapse of Russia, which burst the barriers in the East, broke this blockade, and then the supplies drawn from the Ukraine preserved Austria and relieved Germany. If the Western barrier could also have been broken, whatever might have happened to the armies, a vast territory would have fallen into German hands on which they could have lived and continued to hold out and defy the oceanic blockade. But it would have done still more; it would have aided to a high degree the German offensive at sea 29 . It was a similar fear, this time of a successful enemy push into the Balkans and Middle East, making Germany "practically independent of maritime blockade and... able completely to outstrip the rest of Europe in the reconstruction of their economic and military resources", which caused the despatch of British troops into the Caucasus and towards the Caspian Sea in 1918 30 . Berlin, Britain's strategists could see, was in danger of dominating the "Heartland*. The truth of the matter, as Richmond further observed 31 , was that sea power and land power were inter-dependent, that both were necessary to check the enemy challenge, and that the isolationists' hope of avoiding a continental commitment and relying upon maritime pressure alone would have led to the German domination of the European land-mass and beyond. Furthermore, while nothing was "more misleading or objectionable than the attribution of success to one or the other separately" (Richmond), it was also true that in the first world war Britain was obliged nolens volens to commit an ever-increasing share of her resources to the land struggle, thereby giving that theatre an unprecedented military and political predominance. The only solution remaining was for the navalists to argue for joint operations, to use the army, in Grey's phrase, as "a projectile to be fired by the navy". In the pre-war years Admirals Fisher and Wilson had pressed for a large variety of amphibious schemes, all of which had foundered upon the opposition of the General Staff and the scepticism of the Cabinet. As General Nicholson had put it in 1914, "The truth was that this class of operation possibly had some value a century ago, when land communications were indifferent, but now, when they were excellent, they were doomed to failure. Wherever we threatened to land, the Germans could concentrate superior force S2 ." Yet if the army had gained the decisive first victory in this inter-service dispute, the continental strategy was not to go unchallenged during the war itself. Indeed, the more the casualty figures on the western front rose, the more longingly the Cabinet looked towards the alternative, seabased strategy: once again, political factors became enmeshed in the military considerations, as traditionalists like Esher appealed for a return to the policy of Pitt: When the army of Sir John French was committed to war on the Continent there was no irrevocable breach of this great principle, but, as time went on, and reinforcement after reinforcement was sent to France, absorbing all the available military reserves of the country, its amphibious power was gradually sapped, and has, at the present time, practically been destroyed... It is as true to-day as it was then (the Seven Years' War), that our military power, used amphibiously in combination with the Fleet, can produce results all out of proportion to the numerical strength of our Army ... The moment has come ss . The Allied strike against the Dardenelles in 1915 seemed to provide that "moment" to emulate Pitt and "to produce results all out of proportion" to the forces used -which is no doubt why it attracted a Cabinet looking for a cheaper way to win the war. Unfortunately for this scheme, the forceful Churchill managed to persuade and convince the Cabinet that it could be done even more cheaply than that -by the navy alone. The result, almost inevitably, was disaster, a confirmation of all that the experts had predicted would happen when warships attempted to force their way past strongly-held land defences and floating mines. By the time a hastily-improvised amphibious force arrived, the Turks had immeasurably strengthened their defences and the Allied troops which landed were virtually confined to the beaches until their evacuation at the end of 1915. The disaster at Gallipoli simply reinforced the views of those who insisted that any diversion of troops from the western front weakened the Allied war effort. This did not fully stop the efforts to find a "back-door" route to Berlin, however. In fact, part of Fisher's own hesitating attitude towards the Dardenelles operation was due to his wish to deploy the ships and the men elsewhere -on the Pomeranian coast! Admiral Wilson, for his part, preferred an assault upon Heligoland while their political chief, Churdiill, predictably enough, was in favour of virtually any daring stroke. Later in the war there were again to be proposals for a large-scale intervention in the Baltic to keep Russia in the war or at least to forestall a German seizure of its fleet. All such ideas fell down in the face of the enormous practical disadvantages, even on the naval side alone. As the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff reported: Any attempt to enter the Baltic in force was ruled out by the undoubted presence of minefields whose positions were unknown, by the distance which disabled ships would find themselves from our bases, and by the strategical advantages possessed by the enemy in the existence of the Kiel Canal, which enabled him to move his Battle Fleet at will in a comparatively short time, through the canal, to the North Sea or the Baltic. A project for attacking one or other of the German naval bases was considered impracticable for similar reasons and on account of their heavy coast defences S4 .
In addition, there still remained that even greater obstacle, whidi the navy had never been able to overcome: the army positively refused to have anything to do with amphibious operations whidi would not only weaken the major land onslaught upon Germany but which also threatened to throw away many fine units. And while British generals regarded the schemes as a nonsense, the French political and military leaders saw such diversions as a virtual betrayal. Gallipoli had ended in failure; the Salonika expedition was an inglorious waste of troops; and Baltic operations were deemed impracticable. Only in one region, in fact, were the "Easterners" able to come into their own -the Middle East. Mesopotamia and Palestine were in their way the modern equivalents of Canada and Louisiana, of Bengal and the Cape. In terms of naval strategy, sudi gains could only be applauded: they strengthened the British hold upon Egypt and the Suez Canal, they sheltered the Indian Ocean from any northern challenger, and they made safe the oilfields. But the "side-shows" of which Lloyd George was so proud were, as the "Westerners" duly pointed out, an expensive business: by early 1918, just before Ludendorff's great offensive, there were over 750 000 Empire troops (including 12 British divisions) serving in the Middle East and Salonika. Moreover, in no way could the campaigns of Maude, Allenby and Lawrence be described as combined or amphibious: they were essentially land affairs, with the navy's role a very minor one indeed. Once again, it found little opportunity to increase its stature, and was to remain in the army's shadow.
The world conflict of 1914-1918 proved in the main to be no dieap and swift campaign, but a hard and bloody war of attrition by mass armies in whidi sea power appeared to be a subsidiary factor. It is perfectly true, of course, that had the U-boats won the Battle of the Atlantic, the war as a whole would have been lost by the Allies; and in both world wars the security of the sea routes to Britain was clearly London's first objective, without which little else could be done. Yet two points counted against the navy here. In the first place, this aim was essentially a negative one. The Senior Service could lose the war, but it could not win it: that had to be done by the army, which garnered all the credit thereby. In the second place, this war against the U-boats was a continuous series of small-scale actions which were hardly capable of exciting a public which had been brought up to expect glorious fleet battles and did not understand that these were not necessary to achieve that basic negative aim. In this respect, it would be no exaggeration to state that the course of the first world war substantially discredited that mighty host of great grey battleships, swinging on their anchors in the distant harbour of Scapa. In addition to these fairly obvious aspects of the decline in the effectiveness of British sea-power, there were two further, and equally serious developments: the financial and industrial losses Britain suffered during the war, and her increasing dependence upon the goodwill of other naval powers whilst she concentrated her fleets in European waters. The exact balance-sheet of Britain's losses during the war is still a matter for debate 35 ; but what is clear is that instead of boosting the country to the front rank of the world's military/naval and commercial/ industrial powers as the Napoleonic conflict had done, it caused grievous strain. About 745 000 Britons (9 °/o of the men under 45) were killed in the war and a further 1 600 000 injured, many very seriously; merchant shipping of 7 3 /i million tons was sunk; British exports were also lost, in a direct sense to Central Europe, and in an indirect sense through the concentration of her industries upon war production; and, despite heavy tax increases, the National Debt rose alarmingly from £ 650 million to £ 7,435 million. The United States replaced Britain in many world markets and took over as the greatest creditor nation, while the pound steadily weakened in value against the dollar. A somewhat similar trend could be observed with regard to Britain's increasing dependence upon foreign navies on overseas stations. Here, too, was a continuation of that pre-war development described earlier; but now that she was engaged in actual fighting, the dependence was much more real than when she was simply instituting a precautionary concentration of force against a rising German navy. In the Far East, for example, the Admiralty was forced after 1914 to rely more and more upon Japan, even though it reassured itself with the thought that this was only a temporary eclipse of their influence which would have to be restored after the war. But for the Cabinet and the Committee of Imperial Defence, at least, as one scholar has recently shown, the real problem was to evolve "a diplomacy and strategy to underpin the permanent decline of British power in this region " 36 . In this sense, the war had only acted as an accelerator rather than as a catalyst; and the more Britain poured her resources into the European struggle, the relatively weaker her Far Eastern position became. More alarming still by the closing stages of the war was the attitude of the United States, where the "big navy" circles had persuaded Congress and the President to accept the idea of "a navy second to none" -an aim which even Tirpitz, though he privately hoped for it, had never publicly outlined. Given the vast industrial resources of the United States, this ambition was clearly realisable: already by the end of the war the U.S. Navy had a fleet equal in size to the combined navies of France, Italy and Japan, and the Navy Department was asking Congress for an eventual force of 39 Dreadnoughts and 12 battlecruisers. Such a fleet "dwarfed even the Grand Fleet in its prime", notes Professor Marder, particularly since all these vessels were modern whereas the majority of the British capital ships had been built before the war. And while Professor Schilling has argued that the real objective of this enormous programme was "to force Great Britain to support the league-of-nations project and then to collaborate in a general reduction of armaments on the basis of naval equality with the United States", it is clear that Anglophobes like Admiral Benson were out to get the decisive superiority that this total implied 37 .
Here was the greatest naval challenge to the Royal Navy's mastery yet seenand launched at the worst possible time, when Britain was heavily in debt to the United States, physically and psychologically exhausted by the war, and desperate to reduce her enormous defence expenditures. To emerge from the most destructive war in history with the prospect of a ruinous naval race, and all its financial and domestic consequences, looming ahead simply appalled British politicians and admirals, yet this seemed very probable unless an agreement could be reached with the touchy and suspicious Americans. The scuttling of the High Seas Fleet at Scapa eased the problem, but even before then Lloyd George had declared that he was satisfied with American promises to abandon or substantially to modify the 1918 additional programme instead of the basic 1916 fleet plan. The "freedom of the seas" difference was simply shelved.
Although the Cabinet as a whole professed its satisfaction with this compromise, it was apparent to all involved that only a truce rather than a lasting settlement had been readied, and that it was impossible to persuade the United States to acknowledge British maritime supremacy. Equally obvious was the underlying reason for Lloyd George's conciliation: What Britain needed to compete successfully with the United States Navy was a throbbing economy capable of undertaking new ships comparable to the dreadnoughts and battlecruisers already authorized by Congress and far more. This Lloyd George did not have... In 1919 British statesmen and naval men fought to retain acknowledged first place for the Royal Navy, but they failed because the exhausted island kingdom was unable to match the great resources of continental United States. By 1919, in short, the trident was passing peacefully from Britain to the United States 38 .
In the inter-war years those two long-term trends pin-pointed earlier by Mackinder, the decline in Britain's relative position in world politics, and the challenge to the traditional navalist doctrines, continued unabated. On the one hand, the Depression not only seemed to have more deleterious effects upon industry in Britain than elsewhere, but the collapse of international trade severely reduced the earnings power of its financial and shipping services. On the other hand, despite the world-wide slump, those countries which were rich in land, population and technology -the United States and, to a lesser extent, Russia and Nazi Germany -had increased their relative economic strength by 1939 compared with such declining powers as Britain and France. Moreover, the introduction of the aeroplane as a military weapon was throwing into question the whole future of the surface fleets so praised by Mahan, although the admirals in all countries fought a strenuous rearguard action to preserve their capital ships. Add to this the failure to ban the submarine as weapon of war, and the widespread public demand in Britain for drastic cuts in defence expenditures, and it is plain to see why the 1920s and 1930s are regarded as a "black spot' in British military and naval history. But the most unfortunate aspect of British defence policy in the inter-war years was the failure to learn certain basic lessons from the 1914-1918 conflict. The greatest of these was the impracticality of "the British way of warfare" in a struggle involving continental powers with great industries and large armies which posed a threat to Britain's interests. As John Terraine has put it, the historical truth is there was no shorter way, until the possession and use of the atomic bomb by one side created it... What the past has shown is that armies of millions, equipped by modern technology, cannot be defeated quickly, and that war economies show almost incredible capacity for survival even under the most intense duress, as Germany proved in 1944 and 1945. It requires the fullest, sustained pressure on both the military and economic fronts to adiieve "victory" se .
Instead, the British nation and its leaders, recoiling from the slaughter of the trendies, strove to recreate the golden days of splendid isolation. The army was reduced once again to being an imperial police force; the navy returned to the Mediterranean and to "showing the flag"; and the Royal Air Force, although only effective in its forays against Arab tribes in the Middle East, was supposed to be a deterrent against any aggressor in Europe itself -a dieap and controllable substitute for a well-equipped Expeditionary Force. What they failed to see was that the Versailles settlement had not fundamentally altered the power balance in Europe. To those imbued in the traditions of Palmerston and Disraeli, perhaps this did not matter so much: they had gained German colonies, bases and coaling stations; and they had expanded into the Middle East. Under such circumstances, imperialists sudi as Curzon, Smuts, Milner and, by extension, Lloyd George, were willing to tolerate the continued existence of Bismarck's empire in Europe with only a few transfers of disaffected border regions. Yet this was the country which, as Professor Northedge points out, for the four and half years of the First World War, with no considerable assistance from her allies, had held the rest of the world at bay, had beaten Russia, had driven France, the military colossus of Europe for more than two centuries, to the end of her tether, and in 1917, had come within an ace of starving Britain into surrender. It would have required a coalition of all these states, together with the United States, to contain Germany after 1918, even had the Nazis never come to power 40 .
Ironically enough, one of Mackinder's final books was to pinpoint again the nub of this problem. In 1919 he returned to his main theme with a plea for the Allied victors to create and actively to support East European "buffer" states in order to prevent Germany from again seeking to dominate the continent: "The test of the League", he warned, "will be in the Heartland of the Continent" 41 . Whilst Hitler and Nazi geopoliticians sudi as Haushofer accepted Mackinder's ideas with enthusiasm, the British disregarded them and remained cool to the notion of a continental commitment despite the fact that Germany's central position, large population and immense industrial potential would, if ever utilised by expansionist politicians, once again tend towards the domination of Europe. Against such a development, an isolationist, Empire-centred, pacifistic foreign policy by London would be a simple recipe for disaster, particularly when the new advances in tank strategy were to make land forces more mobile and hardhitting than ever before. There was no sudden diange of attitude in London when Hitler's expansion commenced and the German threat to France became more marked as the balance of power tilted further towards Berlin through the reoccupation or conquest of the Saarland, the Rhineland, Austria and the Sudetenland. Even when the British began to respond, attitudes were confused and contradictory. On the one hand there was a growing awareness of how far she had fallen behind Germany in armaments production and of the need to buy time until her weaknesses in this field were made good. On the other hand there lingered that dislike of a continental commitment and a distinct preference for a mainly maritime-based form of warfare -a tendency which the simultaneous threats from Italy and Japan only strengthened. It was as late as the Spring of 1939, in fact, before the British Cabinet reconciled itself to the notion of sending an expeditionary force to France and instituting a limited form of military conscription, in a belated recognition of the need to preserve the balance of power in western Europe 42 . Nevertheless, the small size of this force suggested that its main purpose was political -to give "moral" support to wavering and nervous allies. The only comfort, so far as the Chiefs of Staff were concerned, was to be found in the fact that a war with Germany would be a lengthy conflict, in whidi the Allies would reveal the superior staying power. By using the traditional economic weapon of the naval blockade, by steadily augmenting the world-wide resources of the British and French empires, and by dealing with Italy first if that power dared to engage in war, the strategic experts hoped to find the best method of achieving eventual victory without too excessive a cost 4S .
For this reason alone, as for many others, the second world war was very much a repeat of the first. It might seem that, in terms of actions fought and battles won, the performance of the Royal Navy in this conflict was incomparably better than in the first. So it was; but this was mainly due to the fact that that overwhelming superiority in ships and men, which had permitted the Admiralty to adopt a predominantly passive strategy between 1914 and 1918 and to reap the benefits therefrom, no longer existed. Now that they were stretched and strained throughout the globe, the British displayed an ingenuity and a ruthlessness whidi more comfortable situations rarely bring forth. Yet as soon as we take our eyes from the battles and the ships and the men, and turn to scrutinise those factors whidi form the basis for naval mastery, it becomes clear that, far from emerging in an enhanced position in 1945, British sea power had been grievously stricken by the war. Those trends which Madsinder had detected at the turn of the century had just received their greatest confirmation. Essentially, all that the navy had done -and could do -in strategical terms was to keep open the sea routes to Britain from the outside world, just as it had done in the first world war. This was a quite vital function, in Churchill's words it was the "foundation" upon whidi victory was based; yet it remained a negative, defensive contribution basically. Even here, however, the struggle was much more in the balance than it had been during the earlier conflict: the Mediterranean and Far Eastern routes were interrupted, the Arctic route had to be suspended occasionally and the Atlantic losses were far heavier than in 1914-1918 despite the swift adoption of the convoy system. What is also clear is that Britain only survived the U-boat onslaughts because of weapons and counter-measures which had little to do with the traditional ways with which she had maintained command of the sea: the introduction of American-built very long range Liberators to close the Atlantic "gap"; escort-carriers, again American-built in most cases; the strategic bombing campaign, whidi caused delays to the German submarine construction programme; and the launching of sufficient merchant vessels to keep pace with the sinkings, an activity where the United States equalled and then surpassed its staggering first world war production performance. The development of new methods of detecting submarines, the exhausting labours of convoy duty and the grim fights with the enemy were overwhelmingly an affair of the Royal Navy; but it is doubtful whether they would have sufficed without the assistance of these non-British, non-naval factors.
The most important of these new elements, predictably enough, was air power, indicated perhaps by the fact that whereas 246 U-boats were sunk by Allied surface craft, 288 were sunk by Allied aircraft (excluding bombing raids) 44 . The second world war saw the full arrival and exploitation of this revolutionary weapon and the fulfillment of the prophecies of Douhet, Mitchell, Trendiard and others that aircraft were vital to achieve dominance over land and sea theatres. As sudi, this did not invalidate Mahan's doctrines that command of the sea meant control of those "broad highways", the lines of communication between homeland and overseas ports; but it did spell the end of the navy's claim to a monopoly role in preserving such sea mastery. And the Admiralty's established belief that a fleet of battleships provided the ultimate force to control the ocean seaways was made td look more old-fashioned than ever -and very erroneous and dangerous. Time and time again, off Norway, Dunkirk and Crete, during the Arctic and Mediterranean convoys, in the early stages of the war against Japan, the threat from the air was made plain. In the Pacific war the Americans demonstrated the supremacy of the aircraftcarrier whilst demoting their battleships to the role of pre-invasion bombardment vessels. Yet when the British Admiralty belatedly sought to enhance its own fleet carrier numbers, it discovered that its shipyards were too cramped to do more than complete existing orders by the end of the war 45 .
If the second world war demonstrated that command of the sea was dependent upon a prior command of the air, it also failed to confirm the superiority and effectiveness of maritime power in its more ancient relationship -with continental land power. In the American campaign against the widely dispersed Japanese Empire, of course, the outcome was different; but the British seemed never to have understood the basic geographical contrast between their two main enemies. Thus it was that the strategical role played by the Royal Navy against Germany was a mere repetition of that in the years 1914-1918: holding the line. The fact that it was much more difficult and called for more frequent displays of heroism to accomplish this task, because the odds were greater, the convoy routes more dangerous and attacks from the air more common, should not obscure this basic point. In all other respects, too, the navy's tasks -and accomplishments -were to be repeated. There was no need to overrun enemyheld colonies (except those of Italy), but even if Germany had possessed overseas territories it is doubtful whether their capture by the British would have had any profound effect upon the war. Nevertheless, there remained the more important naval weapons of the blockade and the landing of troops, either for peripheral raids or for larger-scale strategical purposes. Yet in neither case was the part played by the navy as decisive as one might have imagined.
In view of the experiences of the first world war, of Germany's dominant military and economic position in Europe by 1939 and of the fact that she was bordered by neutrals, it is difficult to understand how British leaders could have been so confident of the effects of a naval blockade, even in the long term. Yet before the outbreak of war, as we have seen, the Chiefs of Staff had declared their faith in this weapon; and the swift overrunning of Poland did nothing to check their opinion that it was economic pressure "upon which we mainly rely for the ultimate defeat of Germany" 4e . The American Neutrality Acts, which had the political effect of making the "freedom of the seas" dispute an irrelevancy, were adjudged to be an additional advantage. As a consequence, Whitehall possessed a quite unjustified optimism about the struggle with Germany, the sole result of which was to make it disinclined to end the period of the Phoney War. "What we ought to do is just to throw back the peace offers and continue the blockade", noted Chamberlain, "I do not believe that holocausts are required." "The Allies are bound to win in the end ..."
47 Despite the commitment of the Expeditionary Force to France, there lingered that traditional fear of trendi warfare on a massive scale; which, together with the exaggerated notion of the effects of the "Hunger Blockade" upon Germany in 1918-1919, combined to persuade the British that it would not be necessary to oppose the enemy's vast armies until his resources and morale were crumbling.
The flaw in this calculation was a massive one and became even more apparent after the fall of France in 1940: London's estimate of the enemy's military strength contrasted sharply with its estimate of his economic power, even though those two elements had been so closely fused together that they were virtually indistinguishable. The well-known Russian and American diarges of British tergiversation and reluctance to open a Second Front, although undeniably true, were easy to understand. To oppose a much enlarged Wehrmacht in complete control of the continent with a far smaller British Empire force was, even apart from the problems of air command and logistical support, a suicidal gesture, and Churchill was correct in resisting the pressure from his allies for a premature invasion. But it was precisely because Germany was in sudi a dominant position and controlled the destinies and economies of the greater part of Europe that the British should have been wary of any hopes of Nazi rule collapsing due to maritime pressure alone. Mahan-ite methods were ineffectual against a power which had adopted a Mackinder-ite programme.
On the face of it, the British experts reckoned, Germany was very susceptible to blockading pressure: like any modern industrialised state, she traded extensively with the outside world and her war economy was dependent upon some absolutely vital raw materials 48 . Over 66 % of her ores for steel production came from abroad, as did 25 % of her zinc, 50 °/o of her lead, 70 °/o of her copper, 90 %> of her tin, 95 % of her nickel, 99 % of her bauxite, 66 °/o of her oil, 80 °/o of her rubber and even 10-20 °/o of her foodstuffs. She was also heavily dependent upon imports of cotton, wool, mercury, mica, sulphur and manganese. Presented with these facts, it may not be surprising to learn that "both Government and country regarded the blockade as Britain's chief offensive weapon, and looked to it for decisive, or at any rate dramatic results 49 .° Yet this presumption could only be justified if Germany was an island; if the German leaders had been unable to take precautionary measures; if they could not secure supplies, either from friendly neutrals or conquered territories; and if her armed forces were so heavily engaged in battle that her stocks were being run down and her productivity insufficient. However, none of these provisos was to be true until the later stages of the war, when reliance upon the blockade had been abandoned for more direct measures in any case. From the outset of his policy of aggression, Hitler had realised the dangers that might come about from the cutting off of overseas supplies and he strove, through the 4-Year-Plan and other measures, to combat the effects of a possible blockade. His aim, widely-proclaimed, was economic autarky, an absolute freedom from dependence upon other states -and as such a direct contrast to the liberal concepts of international economic interdependence which influenced British attitudes. Such a target was to be achieved in part by the creation of substitutes, despite the higher costs involved: synthetic wool (from a wood base), rubber (from buna) and fuel (through hydrogenation) were the main products here. On similar grounds, low-grade iron ores which hitherto had been considered unusable were now exploited, and domestic foodstuffs production was intensified. Secondly, there was a ready flow of materials from pro-Axis and neutral states: ores from Sweden; oil, foodstuffs and copper from Rumania, Russia and Yugoslavia; molybdenum from Norway; nickel and dirome from the Balkans; wolfram from Spain and Portugal: bauxite from Italy and Hungary. Only by a decisive blow in Scandinavia to cut the flow of Swedish iron ore to Germany could great damage be done to the Nazi economy by the Royal Navy -which goes far to justify the Allies' Norwegian policy and at least part of the way to explain Churdiill's reckless scheme for operations in the Baltic 50 . The threat from German air power quashed this latter project, however, as it did the whole Norwegian venture. Finally, there was conquest: the looting of Europe to enrich the Thousand-YearReich and to create a completely autarkic economy. Once again, Hitler was quite clear about his plans. Russia, the Heartland, he enthused, would be the key: "We shall be the most self-supporting State, in every respect, including cotton, in the world ..." 51 But on the way to this great aim many other countries could be pillaged. The victories in the west in 1940, for example, were not simply the military ones of defeating enemy armies or the strategical one of gaining access to the Atlantic; there was also the acquisition of the Lorraine-LuxembourgMinette iron ore deposits; the stockpiles of various important metals in Belgium; more oil reserves in France than the Wehrmacht had used in the Polish, Norwegian and French campaigns together; and the opening of a land route to the tungsten and ores and wolfram of Spain and Portugal and the bauxite of North Africa. Similarly, the seizure of Norway secured the supply of molybdenum and nickel, the over-running of Yugoslavia and Greece provided bauxite and other metals, and the virtual takeover of Rumania greatly eased the oil situation. As agents of this new Herrenvolk, the occupation forces and offices had no scruples about intensive exploitation of captured resources; the "contributions" from these territories to Germany's national income rose from 8 % in the early years of the war to 20 °/o by 1942. Nor was it true, until after 1942 at least, that the actual operations of war were draining the Nazi economy: until the battles of Moscow and Stalingrad the Germans were leisurely waging war, enjoying both the guns and butter that a Blitzkrieg strategy allowed. As a result British war production, far behind in the pre-war years, caught Germany up and by 1942 Britain was actually spending half as mudi again on munitions, giving her a 60 °/o superiority in aircraft and small arms production and a 33% superiority in tank output. In that year, however, with the defeats on the Eastern Front and the entry of the United States combining to convince the Nazi leadership of the need to organise for a long struggle, German production shot ahead again. Under Speer's leadership, the vast German labour force of 41,2 million (cf. Britain's 22,6 million; both 1943) and enormous industrial potential of half a continent was made much more efficient. On the eve of the Normandy invasion, ironically enough, Germany was better stocked in most types of military equipment than ever beforemaking the strategy of wearing down her resistance by blockade appear quite absurd. Yet if British war production was being outpaced by a reorganised German industry, this provided little consolation in Berlin when Russian and American output was growing even faster. In the years 1942-1944, Germany's annual production averages of 26 000 aircraft and 12 000 tanks and self-propelled guns was far behind the Russian averages of 40 000 and 30 000 respectively 62 . American war production was simply phenomenal: in 1941 it was only 75 °/o of Germany's, but by the following year it was already 2V2 times as great and still in its early stages. Whereas the Americans had built only 2 100 aircraft in 1939, this had risen to 48 000 in 1942, 86 000 in 1943 and to a staggering 96 300 in 1944. In fact, in the five years 1940-1945 the United States produced 297 000 aircraft, 86 000 tanks, 17 400 000 small arms, 64 500 landing vessels and 5 200 larger ships (of nearly 53 million tons) 5S . In terms of military potential, therefore, the Americans were in a virtually unchallengable position, with Russia second, Germany third and Britain only a modest fourth. Nevertheless, if the 1939 beliefs in the effectiveness of a blockade and in the long-term British economic superiority over Germany were illusions, it remains true that the Nazi industrial machine collapsed into ruins between 1944 and 1945. The first cause of this was obvious; the losses in men and materials in the prolonged fighting against the Allies, particularly on the Eastern Front, were by then far in excess of Germany's resources. Furthermore, as the Wehrmacht was forced to surrender territory, so correspondingly did Speer lose supplies of raw materials -a trend which was aggravated by the increasing unwillingness of neutrals to provide help to a failing empire. Rivalries within the Nazi hierarchy, and the diversion of workers from production into fighting in October, 1944, were equally deleterious in their effects. Most important of all, however, was the strategic bombing campaign, whidi after a disappointing first few years had by 1944 adiieved the strength and the accuracy which its prophets had forecast for it two decades earlier. In February of that year the assaults upon the German aircraft industry caused structural damage in 75 °/o of all airframe component and assembly plants. Later in the year the bombers switched to oil production, causing such a crisis that German tanks, aircraft and warships were frequently unable to operate in crucial campaigns due to the lack of this commodity; and in early 1945 they struck at the German transport system with devastating effect, isolating the coalfields from industry. "The development of the long-range bomber", Milward writes, "provided a means of economic warfare infinitely more effective than the traditional blockade." It was far more positive and specific, and the fact that "many of the calculations on whidi the naval blockade had been based had been nullified by Germany's extension of her territorial area of control" made no difference to it. "It effected a virtual revolution in economic warfare 54 ." Yet if Allied statesmen could rejoice at the achievements of this new weapon and encourage its use -and Britain is estimated to have devoted 50-60 % of its entire war production to the R.A.F. -this simply served to illustrate the decline in the importance of the naval blockade and of sea power itself. The best that could be said about the traditional policy was that to abandon it might have eased the economic pressure upon the enemy. Nevertheless, the system of contraband control and pre-emptive buying at source was more effective than naval measures and the official British historian of this topic has concluded that "at no stage of the war was Germany decisively weakened by shortages due to the blockade alone." Her Achilles Heel was struck "by the bomber and not by the blockade 55 ." Only Japan and Britain itself, being island states heavily dependent upon sea-borne trade, proved economically susceptible to enemy naval pressure in the second world war, although in both cases it was the submarine and not surface warships which provided the danger. In almost the same way, the navy's importance in amphibious operations was also overtaken by air and land power. Crete and Norway showed that sudi steps could only be taken when command of the air had been secured; Dieppe and Greece showed that small-scale interventions would always be punished by superior enemy forces able to rush swiftly to the point of attack. All signified, as the British Chiefs of Staff could see, that an invasion of western Europe would have to be a massive one and that they would have to wait upon the Americans. Yet the success of Overlord, when it came, was heavily dependent upon Allied air superiority, whidi had been steadily won in the preceding two years. British and American bombers devastated the enemy's communications system before the invasion started; their fighters protected the massive convoys and the bridge-M Milward, p. 115. " Medlicott, vol. 1, pp. 631, 640.
head from aerial interference; and their bombers were again at work in the period after D-Day, checking the enemy's counter-attack and forcing him to travel at night. By comparison, the navy's role was far less significant; their supporting gunfire was certainly of use to the invading troops, "but the decisive factor was the paralysing effect of the Allied air forces ..." 56 In any case, despite the undeniable success of the Overlord operation, the real stuffing was knocked out of the German Army on its Eastern Front, where it suffered over four-fifths of its casualties and where Soviet military casualties were greater than those of all combatants in the first world war. Compared with this struggle for Mackinder's Heartland, the British-led campaigns in North Africa and Italy were mere sideshows in the Churchill -Lloyd George tradition of avoiding the slaughter of frontal confrontations. Yet if the second world war did anything -apart from illustrating the overall decline in the effectiveness of warships alone -it was to break the myth of the efficacy of the "British way of warfare" against a power which straddled half a continent.
The greatest flaw in the British over-estimation of the effects of their sea power lay in the associated calculation that, whilst the blockade was steadily sapping the enemy's strength, the superior economic resources of the Empire would be assembled to provide the eventual retribution; that, just as Britain's combined maritime and financial pressures had caused the collapse of the Dutch and French challenges in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, so too it would undermine the German threat in the twentieth. Yet this assumption, accepted by almost everyone from armchair strategists to the Chiefs of Staff, was based upon the fallacy that Britain's productive strength, her control of raw materials and especially her financial resources, were as well equipped to withstand war now as they had been in the era of her rise to economic supremacy in the western world -which clearly was no longer the case. Contrary to expectations, it was she who experienced shortages of raw materials, caused partly by the Japanese conquest of Far Eastern sources of rubber, tin, sisal, hemp, tungsten and hardwood; and partly by the successful German "counterblockade" of the U-boats. Moreover, as we have seen above, Britain could not match the munitions production of her enemy once Speer had reorganised the German armaments industry; nor could she, even with substantial Commonwealth reinforcements, hope to field an army strong enough to challenge the Wehrmacht on the continent. In May 1942, as the rapid rise in munitions output was beginning to reach that plateau dictated by the size of Britain's population, the Minister of Labour warned Churchill that further demands for manpower for the armed forces must be met mainly by diverting workers from industry, and thereby reducing production 57 . To keep up the war effort, to achieve the proclaimed aim of "victory at all costs", they were forced more and more to rely upon the United States: she alone had the industrial capacity and the manpower to ensure the defeat of Germany in the west. In the second quarter of 1942 American military output caught up with the British; by the end of 1943, her production of aircraft was double, her laundiings of merchant vessels six times, that of Britain; and by 1944 her overall armaments production was six times as large 58 . The full potential of her continent-wide resources, her great population, her more modern industry, was at last being realised -to produce a super-power which was as far ahead of Britain as the latter had been of the declining and smaller states of Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands centuries earlier.
The chief consequence of this disparity in strength was that Britain became dependent upon American aid to an ever-increasing degree: in 1941 10 % of the Empire's munitions came from that source, but it had risen to 27 °/o in 1943 and to 28,7 °/o in 1944. More specifically, the United States supplied -without any apparent strain to its own forces -47 °/o of the Empire's total consumption of tanks, 21 % of small arms, 38 °/o of landing craft and ships, 18 %> of combat and 60 °/o of transport aircraft. But the financial results of the "victory at all costs" programme and the increasing dependence upon American production were disastrous for Britain: her position as an independent great power was shattered. Only emergency shipments of gold, and borrowing from Canada and the Belgian government, helped to keep her solvent by 1941, when her gold and dollar reserves dipped to a mere $ 12 million. In Mardi of that year, however, Roosevelt had succumbed to Churchill's pleadings and to his own fears of a Nazi victory, and he persuaded Congress to pass the famous Lend-Lease Act. Yet the conditions of this aid, and in particular the restrictions upon Britain's exports, crippled the country still further in the long run and increased the extent of her dependence. The decline in exports, Correlli Barnett has noted, "testified ... to the degree to which, like a patient on a heart-lung machine, she was now dependent for life itself upon the United States 59 .° Even the briefest survey of Britain's economic position in 1945 would indicate just how deleterious the conflict had been for her. Only in the number of human casualties could it be said to have been an improvement upon the first world war eo -and that because of the determination to avoid mass assaults until the enemy's resistance had been sapped by the Russian army and the bombing campaign. Her losses in merchant ships totalled 11 455 906 tons, bringing the size of the fleet down to 70 °/o of its 1939 figure despite franctic rebuilding. Bombing had caused extensive damage to housing and industrial property, and the strain of six years of war had worn out mudi of Britain's plant and led to a heavy depreciation of capital equipment -which together destroyed some 10 % of her pre-war national wealth at home and left her in a poor position to recapture her world markets. Lend-lease conditions and the single-minded determination to prosecute the war regardless of the financial consequences had led to the collapse of her export trade, which declined in value from £ 471 million in 1938 to £ 258 million in 1945. During the same period, imports rose from £ 858 million to £ 1,299 million, overseas debt increased nearly fivefold, to £ 3,355 million, and capital assets to the tune of £ 1,299 million were liquidated, thereby halving the net overseas income from this source and making it even more difficult to achieve a balance of payments. She had probably lost about one-quarter (£ 7,300 million) of her pre-war wealth and was now in the unenviable position of being the world's largest debtor nation. And all hopes of a gradual transition to a peacetime economy were shattered by the unexpectedly swift defeat of Japan only three months after the German collapse, at which Truman cut off all lend-lease. The writing was on the wall in other respects, too. The production of the atomic bomb -which appeared to render both sea power and land power irrelevant in a Great Power struggle -illustrated another arena where the British were being gradually left behind 61 . The second world war also dealt the final blow to the notion of imperial unity: whilst nationalist unrest was provoked in Egypt, India and Burma, the self-governing Dominions found it prudent to reinsure with the rising star of the United States when it was apparent that Britain no longer possessed the strength to protect them e2 . Nor was the political picture more promising nearer home. By 1944 it seemed clear that the enormous superiority in men and materials of the Americans would soon bring them victory over a rapidly weakening Germany; but the steady rise in suspicions between Russia and the West led Churchill and others to the conclusion that the tyranny oft the Nazi Gauleiter over central and eastern Europe was about to be replaced by that of the Soviet Commissar. The "big battalions", to use Stalin's phrase, had decided who would control the Heartland and the Red Army was now advancing into Poland, Hungary and the Balkans -a development which the British had as little power to prevent as they had had in defending the Polish Corridor in 1939. Until the United States could be persuaded to recognise the possible danger and to support the liberties of Europe in both economic and military terms, there was little that Churchill could do except to try to arrange a "deal" with Stalin in the hope of defining the limits of Russian expansion As the most exhausting war in her history was drawing to its close, therefore, Britain was as far away as ever from preserving that continental balance of power which was so congenial to her world interests and for which she had entered the struggle against Germany in the first place. With the United States dominating the overseas world and Soviet Russia likely to dominate Europe, the age of the super-powers, predicted many decades earlier by de Tocqueville, Seeley and others, had at last arrived -and the British Empire was not among their number. Instead she was swiftly declining to the ranks of the second-class powers. The contrasts with the United States -and with Britain's own growth in an earlier age through the catalyst of war -were glaring enough to provoke the official historians to point them out at the end of their study of the British war economy: Despite all the contrasts of technology and of economic magnitude between the wars of the Napoleonic Age and those of the twentieth century, there are some striking parallels between the situation of the United Kingdom in the earlier age and the situation of the United States in the later one. Each of these two countries, in its own fortunate time, was able to use the expansion of its exports as an instrument of war; each found itself, at the conclusion of war, in some degree compensated for its efforts and sacrifices by an immense enhancement of its comparative economic strength among the nations. But the United Kingdom in the twentieth century found itself in quite the opposite situation. The nation's struggle after the Second World War to overcome the consequences of an effort which had so heavily overtaxed its economic strength was bound to be a long one M .
Even at the height of the war, the U.S. Military Staff could confidently predict that the profoundly changing world would soon see America and Russia as "the only military powers of the first magnitude", a fact they attributed in each case to a Madkinder-like "combination of geographical position and extent, and vast munitioning potential." At the same time, there was little likelihood that either could emerge supreme since "the relative strength and geographical position of these two powers precluded the military defeat of one... by the other". To which prediction they offered the further statement that "both in an absolute sense and relative to the United States and Russia, the British Empire will emerge from the war having lost ground both economically and militarily 65 ." All great conflicts in the past had witnessed the rise and fall of empires: now it was the turn of two new states to adiieve prominence, and of a third to withdraw from the centre of the international stage whidi she had dominated for so long. *
The above essay, like all historical accounts not written at the time of an event, has enjoyed the immense benefit of hindsight. From our presentday vantage point, no-one would dispute that Britain and her Empire collapsed more swiftly than the political prophets writing around 1900 could have imagined; or that the influence of sea power upon world affairs was also to be steadily curtailed over a similar period. Yet it would be diurlish to upbraid Mahan for not having been able to forecast the future more accurately: economic and political events have been so varied and frequent since his time that a man loses little credit for being wrong about the direction in which the world is to move next. He will always remain respected as the most important historian of British sea power, and as one who exerted a profound influence upon contemporary strategic thought, even though he was far less successful as a political and strategical pundit than as an analyst of the past. In this latter respect, it appears that Mackinder, observing with fascination the way in whidi industrialisation was steadily exploiting the potential of continental land-masses, was the better prophet. As such, he deserves a certain rehabilitation among military and naval thinkers, and a more widespread acknowledgement of the percipience of his writings. Although our complex world is changing very rapidly, we may still have a lot to learn from him -which is another way of saying that it is not infrequently the case that the accepted orthodoxy of the time is often less relevant and acclaimed in retrospect than a doctrine which was then obscure or unpopular. If there is one thing that historians should learn from their subject, it is an awareness of the constant modification of the course of events by new elements, and of the fact that the past is unlikely to repeat itself to any great degree in the future.
